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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CONNIE GULLI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040146-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for aggravated arson, a first degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
discovered pursuant to a third-party consent search? 
The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 
1} 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95,1 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to appoint new counsel to represent 
defendant at sentencing? 
"Whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant who expresses 
dissatisfaction with the court-appointed counsel... is a matter committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with aggravated arson, a first degree felony. R2. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress 
evidence of the arson discovered in a warrantless search of a canvas tote bag discovered 
in the backseat of her son's car. See R138-130 (Memorandum Decision dated 6 May 
2003) (a copy is contained in addendum A). See also R72 (motion); R82-73 (supporting 
memorandum), and R128-124 (reply memorandum). 
Conviction. Following a four day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. 
R294. 
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Sentence- On 11 February 2004, the trial court imposed the statutory 
indeterminate term of from five years to life. R356-354. The trial court also ordered 
defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $258,563.03. R355. 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 13 February 2004. 
R358. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of 13 August 2002, defendant set fire to the home of 
her then in-laws, Margaret and Ken Park, in Cedar City, Utah. R387:153. Defendant 
blamed the Parks for her pending divorce from their son, Mark. R387:153-154; see also 
R388:384-85;R389:586-87. 
The arson investigation. At 2:13 a.m. on the morning of 13 August 2002, 
firefighters from the Cedar City Fire Department were dispatched to the Park home, 
which they found engulfed in flames. R387:89, 123. One firefighter noted that the height 
of the flames suggested it was an exterior, and not an interior, fire. Id. at 123. Although 
quickly extinguished, the blaze caused extensive damage throughout the Park home. 
R387:92, 118; R388:359. A neighboring house was also damaged, and a firefighter 
suffered a second-degree bum. R387:l 19, 127. Firefighters discovered multiple points 
where it appeared someone had attempted to start the fire. Id. at 93-95. This evidence 
raised a suspicion of arson and a deputy state fire marshal from the Utah State Fire 
Marshal's Office, Todd Hohbein, was called to the scene. Id. at 95-96. 
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After an initial walkthrough at approximately 9:00 a.m. that morning, Marshal 
Hohbein noted the odor of gasoline emanating from three attempted burn points: one on 
concrete, another on a toolbench, and a third on the deck. Id. at 201-2, 207, 210. 
Believing from this evidence that he was dealing with an arson, Marshal Hohbein called 
another deputy state fire Marshal, James Dudzinski, to assist in the investigation. 
R388:284. Marshal Dudzinski also concluded that the fire was an arson, originating from 
liquid accelerant which had been poured onto the deck. Id. at 293-94. 
Investigators initially suspect defendant's daughter. Prior to the arrival of 
Marshals Hohbein and Dudzinski, Detective Kelvin Minefee of the Cedar City Police 
Department, also began investigating the fire. R387:143-4. Detective Minefee arrived at 
the Park home around 4:00 a.m. and was immediately directed to Megan and Joseph 
Gulli, defendant's children, and the Park's grandchildren, who were watching the fire. 
R3 87:143-4. Upon learning from Joseph that Megan was the first of the two to discover 
the fire, Detective Minefee spoke with Megan and was immediately suspicious of her 
behavior, statements and clothing. Id. at 148-9. Megan appeared to have recently 
washed and changed her clothes and had the distinct odor of freshly washed hands and 
soap on her forearms and wrists. Id. at 149. When Megan acknowledged that she had 
changed her clothing since the fire started earlier that morning, detective Minefee 
proceeded to the Gulli home to collect Megan's clothing for evidence. Id. at 149-50.l 
'At trial, evidence was adduced that Megan was with a group of friends watching a 
meteor shower when the fire started, and that she changed her clothes upon returning 
home and discovering the fire because she wanted to be "more comfortable," "get calm 
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Investigators begin to suspect defendant Upon arriving at the Gulli home 
around 4:30 a.m., detective Minefee was met by defendant, who told him that she had 
already washed and folded Megan's clothes, which the detective found unusual. Id. at 
149-50, 152. In addition to his concern about Megan's involvement in the fire, Detective 
Minefee told defendant that he was concerned about information from her children that 
"she (defendant) had some disagreements with Margaret and Ken Park." R387:153. 
Defendant acknowledged there were problems in her relationship with her in-laws and 
that she blamed the Parks 'Tor the marital problems that she was going through at the 
present time." Id. Specifically, defendant "indicated that she[,] and at the time, I guess 
her husband, or ex-husband, had been together since she was [fifteen] years old, and that 
they had been married for at least [twenty-four] years, and that there was no way they 
were going to get a divorce, not ever, not now—or not now, not ever." Id. at 154; see 
also R388:299, 375, 405. According to defendant, her in-laws' influence over their son 
was causing "irrational thinking on the part of her husband" and that is "why they were 
going to get a divorce." R387:154; see also R388:384-85, R389:586-87. Defendant 
indicated that she "was not going to tolerate that." R387:154. Given this information, the 
focus of detective Minefee's investigation switched from Megan to defendant. Id. at 155. 
Based on information from detective Minefee, Marshals Hohbein and Dudzinski 
also spoke with members of the Gulli family, including defendant. R388:297, Only 
and relax a little," while they "wait[ed] for information." R388:474; see also R389:728-
731. 
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Megan and two of her friends were present at the Gulli residence when the marshals 
arrived later that day. R387:221; R388:298. Although Megan was aware she was a 
suspect in the arson, she was cooperative, and spoke to Marshal Hohbein inside the 
house, while Marshal Dudzinski interviewed her friends outside. R3 87:221. A short time 
later, defendant arrived back at the home in a car driven by her son Joseph, and 
accompanied by Emily, Joseph's then girlfriend. R387:223, R388:299. Joseph got out of 
the car and entered the house before defendant got out of the car: "She was still sitting in 
the car, seated in the car when I left to go inside." R388:434. Defendant did not enter her 
home, but rather, approached Marshal Dudzinski in the yard behind the house, and 
engaged in a conversation with him. R388:299, 311. 
Evidence of the arson found in defendant's tote bag. While Marshal Dudzinski 
was conversing with defendant in the backyard, Marshal Hohbein spoke with Joseph at 
the front of the house. R3 87:224. Joseph told Marshal Hohbein he suspected that 
defendant had set the fire and that defendant was "unbalanced." R390:886.2 Joseph also 
gave Marshal Hohbein consent to search his car. R3 87:224. In the back seat of the car, 
Marshal Hohbein discovered a green canvas tote bag. Id. at 224. Immediately upon 
opening the tote bag, Marshal Hohbein detected an "extremely strong smell of. . . 
gasoline." Id. at 225. He also found a pair of black gloves, "a pretty excessive amount of 
lint," a broken mason jar, an empty matchbook, and a document signed by defendant. Id. 
2Joseph denied implicating his mother as the arsonist at trial, but did affirm that he 
had said the family was worried about her, and that he had also said he would not be 
sin prised if she implicated him as the arsonist. R3 88:426-427. 
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Marshal Hohbein asked Joseph who had used the car the previous night. Id. at 231. 
When Joseph responded that he had, Marshal Hohbein stated, "Then you are in big 
trouble." Id. at 231. Joseph replied that "the bag had only been in the car a while, not last 
night, and that he didn't put it there." Id. When Marshal Hohbein asked who had placed 
the bag in the car, Joseph said "his mom put the bag there." R387:231; R390:885.3 
"I do not want my kids in trouble. Yes I did it. I will say yes." 
Defendant confesses. While Marshal Hohbein was conversing with Joseph in the 
front yard, Marshal Dudzinski had been conversing with defendant in the backyard. 
During her forty-five minute conversation with Marshal Dudzinski, defendant repeatedly 
expressed her hatred of the Parks, causing Marshal Dudzinski to suspect that she was the 
arsonist: "I was seeing a lot of hatred and a lot of[,] because of how they treated her 
grandchildren and how she was mad being divorced and didn't want to be that way." 
R388:300. When Marshal Dudzinski directly asked defendant if she had started the fire 
Joseph's trial testimony was consistent with Marshal Hohbein's. Indeed, on 
cross-examination by defense counsel, Joseph agreed that upon finding the tote bag, 
Marshal Hohbein "questioned [him] in reference to making it sound like [he] did it." 
R388:444. According to Joseph, Marshal Hohbein "figured out quickly [he] had nothing 
to do with it." Id. Joseph also responded affirmatively to all of defense counsel's follow-
up questions: 
Well, didn't you tell him that she put it in, meaning your mother, she put the 
bag into your car? . . . And that's what shifted—up until that point wasn yt 
Officer Hohbein insinuating that you did it? . . . Then afterwards you said, 
no, she put it into the car, meaning your mother, right? . . . Then the 
investigation shifted over to her, correct? 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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at the Park home, she calmly stated, "I do not want my kids in trouble. Yes I did it. I will 
say yes." R388:301-2; R390:910. 
Marshal Hohbein overheard defendant confess to Marshal Dudzinski as he walked 
into the backyard to tell him about the evidence discovered in Joseph's car. R387:232; 
R390:887-88. According to Marshal Hohbein, defendant repeatedly stated: "I'll take the 
rap for this," and "I'll take the heat on this one to save my kids." R387:232; see also id. 
at 233. Defendant's statements were also overheard by one of Megan's friends, Cade 
Murdock, see R388:564, and by family friend, Dane Ronnow, see R389:721. 
In addition to the items found in defendant's tote bag, and defendant's confession, 
the State adduced evidence that defendant had made suspicious statements about her 
pending divorce to friends. Diane Houle specifically recalled that defendant was "really 
against [the divorce]," and that defendant said, "this is going to have a really good ending 
or a really bad ending." R388:405. Defendant further stated that 
she just wanted to be married to [her ex-husband] Mark. She didn't want to 
do anything else. That's all she wanted in life, that she didn't have anything 
else to live for. The one comment that really alarmed me, she said she was 
working on something. And she didn't want to give us the details. But 
something she was working on that, you know, was going to have a good 
ending or a bad ending. But we didn't know what that was. 
Id. at 406. See also R388:375 ("And [defendant] made a comment of saying, Well, I 
guess we are just going to have to wait and see if there is going to be a happy ending or a 
bad ending."). 
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Diane mentioned to defendant that she had another friend going through a divorce 
and that friend's husband "ended up lighting, setting their house on fire in Beryl." Id. 
When asked why he did it, the friend's husband stated "it was either burn my house down 
or kill myself." Id. Diane encouraged defendant not to follow the husband's example and 
become that distressed over her own divorce. Id. Defendant responded, "I know the 
feeling[.]" Id. See also R388:376-77 ("I know how he feels"). In Diane's opinion, 
defendant was "very fragile." Id. at 407. 
Diane also recalled that when they went camping, defendant "liked fire." 
R388:411. Defendant "was always happy, you know, happy to start the campfire[,]" and 
volunteered to do so. Id. Defendant also fantasized about walking through fire in a fire 
suit. Id. Defendant's former husband, Mark, also testified that defendant liked to build 
big camp fires. R389:588. 
Defendant's theory. At trial, defendant denied that she bore any ill will toward 
the Parks. R389:742. She also testified that she was physically unable to commit the 
arson, due to a Scleroderma flare-up the prior evening. Id. at 743. According to 
defendant, after learning of the arson, she just happened to be taking the "weekly lint 
bag" from the dryer to her garbage can outside when she discovered a plastic bag filled 
with the arson evidence hanging on the garbage can. Id. at 759-77'4. Although detective 
Minefee arrived at the house shortly thereafter, defendant did not turn the arson evidence 
over to him because she feared being implicated as the arsonist. Id. at 765-766. Rather, 
she put her lint bag inside the plastic bag containing the broken jar leaking gasoline, tied 
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the bags up together, and hid the entire bundle "in the freezer[\]" Id. at 765. According to 
defendant, she "had no more than done that," when detective Minefee arrived. Id. After 
detective Minefee left, defendant removed the bundle from the freezer, placed it in her 
green tote bag, and took it with her when Joseph picked her up to run an errand. Id. at 
773-774. 
Defendant also denied ever stating that she would "take the rap" for the arson. Id. 
at 778. According to defendant, she denied committing the arson to Marshal Dudzinski, 
and only agreed to accept responsibility for it after the marshal allegedly stated, "then, 
I'm taking one of the kids in." Id. According to defendant, she replied, "Then take me. . . 
. [I]f you want to take somebody, you have to take somebody in, then you take me, but 
you leave my kids alone. That's what I said. I never said, I'll do it. I'll take the rap for 
it." Id.; see also id. at 814. 
On cross-examination of Mark, defendant's former husband, defense counsel 
asked whether Mark had paid another individual to start the fire using napalm, in an 
alleged attempt to frame defendant and avoid alimony. Id at 599-602. Mark denied the 
allegation. Id. at 601. 
Defendant also adduced evidence from a United Parcel Service employee, a "kind 
of self-taught" fire investigator, R3 89:688; see also id. at 684, that napalm is generally 
available on the "street" to "the gangs, the bikers, the anarchists." R389:664. Defendant 
also adduced evidence from a chemical engineer that in his opinion lighted gasoline was 
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incapable of reaching a high enough temperature to ignite the polymer deck material at 
the Park home, which would require something hotter, like napalm. R390:840-842, 845. 
Rebuttal. On rebuttal, the State called Beth Shanholtz, a registered nurse, who 
"assessed" defendant on 13 August 2004, after the arson was discovered. R390:936; see 
also id. at 935. She observed that defendant, although complaining of pain, was 
ambulatory and needed no assistance to walk. Id. at 935-36. The State also recalled 
Marshals Hohbein and Dudzinski, who established that gasoline burns well above the 
temperature required to ignite polymer. R390:880, 904. 
Closing argument. Defense counsel theorized that other potential suspects, 
including Mark and defendant's children, had not been adequately investigated. See 
R390:989, 993, 998. Defense counsel further theorized that if defendant had confessed to 
the arson, she did so only to spare her children. Id. at 990, 993. Defense counsel also 
hinted that defendant was framed. Id. at 995. In rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded jurors 
that the police investigation had cleared Mark and defendant's children. Id. at 1000. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted evidence of the arson discovered inside 
defendant's tote bag at trial. Marshal Hohbein reasonably believed that Joseph, 
defendant's son, had authority to consent not only to a search of his car, but all its 
contents. Indeed, Joseph put no limitations on the scope of the marshal's search and did 
not inform the marshal that the totebag in the backseat belonged to defendant until after 
the arson evidence had been found. However, even assuming arguendo that the arson 
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evidence should have been suppressed, defendant suffered no prejudice. Defendant's 
confession, hostility toward the victims, and other circumstantial evidence is more than 
sufficient to support the jury verdict. 
The trial court also properly denied defendant's request for new appointed counsel 
at sentencing. Defendant asserts that a mere allegation of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel is alone sufficient to establish a conflict of interest with appointed counsel. 
Defendant's claim is unsupported in the record and by legal authority. She therefore fails 
to show any abuse of the trial court's broad discretion in denying new counsel at 
sentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE DISCOVERED PURSUANT 
TO A THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCH 
In Point I of her brief, defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to suppress, 
among other things, a broken mason jar leaking gasoline, gas-soaked lint, an empty match 
book, and black gloves all discovered inside a tote bag defendant left in the backseat of 
her son Joseph's car. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting this 
evidence even though Joseph consented to a search of his car, because "the officer was 
informed upon picking up the bag that it belonged not to [Joseph,] the consenting party, 
but to his mother." Aplt. Br. at 4. Defendant's claim is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence and otherwise lacks merit. 
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Proceedings below. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence found 
inside the tote bag in the backseat of her son's car. R78-73. Although Joseph consented 
to a search of the car, defendant asserted that Joseph told Marshal Hohbein the canvas 
tote bag belonged to his mother before the marshal retrieved or searched the bag. R74. 
Defendant thus asserted that Joseph's consent to search was ineffective as to the tote bag 
itself. Id. 
Both Marshal Hohbein and Joseph testified at the evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress. See R144. According to Marshal Hohbein, Joseph did 
not identify the canvas tote bag as belonging to his mother until after Marshal Hohbein 
had discovered the arson evidence therein. R144:68; see also R144:52-56. Marshal 
Hohbein recalled that the consensual search began with the trunk of Joseph's car. 
R144:52. When he found nothing in the trunk, Marshal Hohbein "opened the back door 
of the [car]." Id. at 53. Upon opening the door, he saw a "green canvas style pack with 
two little shoulder straps on it that was sitting in the back seat." Id. He saw no 
identifying information on the bag and opened it. Id. at 53-54. "[Ijnstantly," upon 
opening the bag, the marshal detected a "very strong" "smell of what [he] believed to be 
gasolinef.]" Id. at 54. Inside the bag he found "numerous plastic bags," and inside these 
bags he found "a broken glass jar," which "had a very strong gasoline smell coming from 
it." Id. at 54-55. He also found an empty match book, a pair of black gloves, a large 
plastic garbage bag, and lots of lint, some of it soaked with gasoline. Id. at 55-56. 
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As Marshal Hohbein removed these items from the tote bag he placed them on the 
ground. Id. at 56. He then asked Joseph who had used the car the night before. Id. 
When Joseph said he had used the car, Marshal Hohbein told him "[he] could be in a lot 
of trouble." Id. According to Marshal Hohbein, Joseph then said that the bag belonged to 
his mother: "[T]o quote his words[,] [h]e said, 'She put it there.5" Id. When Marshal 
Hohbein asked who he meant, Joseph said, "'My mom put it there.5" Id. 
Joseph's testimony agreed with that of Marshal Hohbein's except that Joseph 
claimed to have told the marshal that the bag belonged to his mother "before [the 
marshal] reached for it. And while he searched it. He knew it was her bag before he 
touched it." R144:163. 
In its Memorandum Decision denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found 
that after Marshal Hohbein discovered the canvas tote bag in the backseat of Joseph's car, 
"[h]e removed it from the car and began to search it when he was told by Joseph that the 
bag belonged to his mother, the defendant." Rl 34(a).4 The trial court further found that 
"Joseph did not tell the investigator that the bag should not be searched. Instead he stood 
watching as the bag was emptied." Id. 
In upholding the search of the tote bag, the trial court rejected defendant's 
argument that Marshal Hohbein was "prevented from searching] the bag" because he 
was "informed that the bag belonged to the defendant, and not to Joseph and Emily." 
4The specific page of the Memorandum Decision referenced above was not 
paginated, but appears between R134 and R133, and will thus be cited as Rl34(a) in the 
State's brief. 
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R131. The trial court ruled that "[t]he law [did] not support that argument." Id. 
Specifically, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search was justified because Joseph 
did not 
place any limitation on the scope of his freely given consent to search the 
car. Even when the officer began to examine the contents of the bag, 
Joseph's only comment was that the bag belonged to his mother. He could 
easily have added that the bag should not be searched if he intended that 
limitation, but he said nothing of the sort. The law presumes that when 
consent to search a car is given, it applies to all containers within the car 
unless the person giving the consent limits the scope of the search. See 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
Id. In so ruling, the trial court emphasized that defendant's "expectation of privacy [was] 
certainly diminished" by the fact that "she le[ft] the bag in a car belonging to someone 
else, or being possessed and driven by someone else," and that "[defendant] certainly 
must expect that the owner or driver of the car may give his pemiission for a search of the 
vehicle by police." R130. 
A. Marshal Hohbein's belief that Joseph's authority to 
consent to a search of his car extended to a tote bag in the 
back seat was objectively reasonable. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that Joseph's 
consent to search his car included the canvas tote bag in the backseat. See R131. 
According to defendant, "the officer was informed upon picking up the bag that it 
belonged not to [Joseph,] the consenting party, but to his mother." Aplt. Br. at 4. 
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a 
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citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he key principle of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness-the balancing of competing interests"). Thus, "[t]he 
Fourth Amendment is no t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only 
against unreasonable searches and seizure." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 
(1985). 
A warrantless—but consensual—search is reasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 250-252 (1991); see also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) 
("Recognized exceptions [to warrant requirement] include consent searches."). 
Moreover, it is reasonable, not only if the defendant consents to the search, but also if a 
person other than the defendant, with authority over the premises, voluntarily consents to 
the search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); see also Brown, 853 
P.2d at 855 ("If a third party rather than the defendant consents to a search, the third party 
must be one who possesses 'common authority' over the area or has some other 
'sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected'") (citation 
omitted). 
In Matlock, the woman with whom Matlock lived consented to a search of the 
bedroom they shared and police found $4,995 hidden inside a diaper bag in the closet. 
415 U.S. at 166-67. Upholding the validity of the consensual search, the United States 
Supreme Court "reaffirmed that a warrantless entry and search by law enforcement 
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officers does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of 'unreasonable searches 
and seizures' if the officers have obtained the consent of a third party who possesses 
common authority over the premises." Rodriguez v. Illinois, 497 U.S. 177,179 (1990) 
(discussing Matlock). The supreme court explained in Matlock that under the doctrine of 
common authority, co-inhabitants "assume[] the risk that one of their number might 
permit the common area to be searched." Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. See also State v. 
Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 11, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (same). In Rodriguez, the 
supreme court extended Matlock to hold that "a warrantless entry" is also "valid when 
based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, 
reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does 
not do so." 497 U.S. at 179. 
Here, defendant does not dispute that Joseph had authority to consent to a search 
of the car that he shared with his then fiancee, Emily. Aplt. Br. at 4-6. Rather, defendant 
narrowly challenges only the trial court's ruling that Joseph's authority to consent to a 
search of his car extended to the canvas tote bag in the back seat: "The issue is whether 
the son's consent to search the car covered the search of the bag." Aplt. Br. at 4. In other 
words, defendant disputes that it was objectively reasonable for Marshal Hohbein to 
believe that Joseph's consent to the search included the tote bag in the backseat. As a 
general rule, however, "consent to search a space includes consent to search containers 
within that space where a reasonable officer would construe the consent to extend to the 
container." United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Jimeno, 
17 
500 U.S. at 251 and Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999)). Because it was 
objectively reasonable for Marshal Hohbein to believe that Joseph had authority to 
consent to a search of the car and all of its contents, the trial court's ruling should be 
affirmed. 
Indeed, contrary to defendant's claim, and consistent with the weight of the 
evidence, Marshal Hohbein found the arson evidence inside the tote bag well before 
Joseph told him the bag actually belonged to his mother, defendant. The trial court's 
pretrial finding, that Marshal Hohbein "removed [the tote bag] from the car and began to 
search it when he was told by Joseph that the bag belonged to his mother, the defendant," 
is admittedly less than clear on this point. Rl 34(a). What is clear, however, is that the 
trial court did not find, as defendant claims, that Joseph told the marshal the tote bag 
belonged to defendant "prior to [his] searching its contents." Aplt. Br. at 4 (emphasis 
added). To the contrary, the trial court implicitly, if not expressly, rejected defendant's 
claim that the marshal knew the bag belonged to defendant before he began to search it. 
&?eR134(a). 
In any event, by the time of trial, Joseph no longer maintained that Marshal 
Hohbein knew to whom the tote bag belonged before he searched it. See R388:44. 
As set out in greater detail at p.7 n.2, supra, Joseph acknowledged that when Marshal 
Hohbein discovered the tote bag and its gas-soaked contents in the backseat of Joseph's 
car he thought it belonged to Joseph, and that Joseph was therefore the arsonist. See 
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R3 8 8:444. Joseph also affirmed that it was only after he told Marshal Hohbein that the 
bag belonged to his mother that the marshal's suspicion shifted to defendant. Id. 
While Utah has no rule, some appellate courts will consider evidence adduced at 
trial to affirm a trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 
(10th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1002 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 
1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l (La Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 
879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686, 688 
(Haw. App. 1994) (reversal). Thus, although Joseph's trial testimony was adduced after 
the trial court's pretrial finding here, it clarifies the ambiguous finding and should 
therefore be considered. 
As demonstrated above, the weight of the evidence supports that Marshal Hohbein 
found the arson evidence before Joseph told him the bag belonged to defendant. 
Additionally, the trial court found that Joseph never "place[d] any limitation on the scope 
of his freely given consent to search the car." Rl 34(a). Therefore, because Joseph 
neither told the marshal that the tote bag belonged to defendant, nor excluded it from the 
scope of his consent, and because there was no identifying information on the exterior of 
the bag, see R144:52-56; R387:224-225, 231; R388:444; R390:885, it was objectively 
reasonable for the marshal to believe that Joseph's consent to search the car included the 
bag. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179. Accordingly, the broken jar leaking gasoline, gas-
soaked lint, empty matchbook, and black gloves found inside the tote bag were properly 
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admitted at trial. Id; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170; see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-252 
(driver Jimeno's consent to search car reasonably understood to include closed paper bag 
in passenger seat, thus no obligation to seek independent consent to search it). Cf. Duran, 
2005 UT App 409, ^f 16-17 (holding that where police knew suspect lived in a trailer 
owned by his mother, it was unreasonable to proceed with a warrantless search of the 
trailer based on mother's consent, "absent reasonable inquiry into [her] mutual use of the 
trailer"). 
Moreover, the arson evidence was properly admitted at trial, even assuming 
arguendo that defendant maintained some expectation of privacy in the tote bag after 
leaving it unsecured in Joseph's car. State v. Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, 
cited by defendant, is not to the contrary. In Bisseger, this Court acknowledged that in a 
traffic stop scenario, "a car passenger does not normally have standing to object to a 
search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car," or its contents. 
2003 UT App 256, ^ 8 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (1978)). See also 
State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Utah App. 1993) (holding Scott, a passenger, did 
not have an expectation of privacy in the car itself where he left personal items in the 
glove box). However, the Court held that although Bisseger could not contest the search 
of the car itself, she maintained an expectation of privacy in an opaque lip-balm container 
she left in the car. Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, ffi| 9-12. The Court thus concluded that 
Bisseger, "as a passenger asked by a police officer to leave the car, ha[d] standing to 
object to the seizure and search of her personal property found inside the car." Id. at j^ 12. 
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The Court further held that Bisseger did not abandon her expectation of privacy in the lip-
balm container when she left it in the car at the officer's behest, but reached that 
determination by applying "an incorrect burden of proof." State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, 
\ 13, 20-24, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (disagreeing with Bisseger and identifying 
preponderance standard as the correct burden of proof for establishing abandonment of an 
expectation of privacy). 
Importantly, Bisseger did not prevail in challenging the search of her lip-balm 
container because she maintained some expectation of privacy in it. See Houghton, 526 
U.S. at 303 ("Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy 
with regard to the property that they transport in cars"). Rather, Bisseger ultimately 
prevailed in her challenge because the driver's consent to search his car and its contents 
was tainted by an illegal detention. Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, \ 20 (officer exceeded 
"the scope of detention when he requested permission to search the car," thus, "the search 
of the car and particularly the search of the lip-balm container was illegal"). Thus, 
Bisseger is not dispositive here. 
In contrast to Bisseger, Joseph's consent to search his car was indisputably valid 
and untainted. Moreover, as set forth above, Marshal Hohbein's belief that Joseph's 
consent to search included the tote bag in the backseat of the car was objectively 
reasonable. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. atl79; Matlock, 415 U.S. atl70. See also Jimeno, 
500 U.S. at 250-252. Therefore, even assuming defendant, like Bisseger, maintained 
some expectation of privacy in a personal item she left in another's car, unlike Bisseger, 
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she cannot prevail in challenging the search of that item, given her son's third-party 
consent to search. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1995) 
("By leaving his bag in the possession and control of Hollis, [Austin] assumed the risk 
Hollis would allow the authorities access to the bag."). 
B. Even assuming that the arson evidence should have been suppressed, 
defendant suffered no unfair prejudice. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 
arson discovered in defendant's tote bag, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice. 
Defendant's confession, her hostility toward the victims, and other circumstantial 
evidence, is more than sufficient to support the jury verdict. 
Indeed, defendant's statements to Marshal Dudzinski accepting responsibility for 
the arson were overheard by Marshal Hohbein and two family friends. See, e.g., 
R387:232-33, R388:301-02, 564; R389:721; R390:887-88, 910. Although defendant's 
strategy was to deny having confessed and to suggest that other potential suspects, 
including her children, were inadequately investigated, the evidence was to the contrary. 
Joseph was working at Wal-Mart at the time the fire started, see, e.g., R387:166, Megan 
was with friends watching a meteor shower, see, e.g., R387:221-222; R388:556-559, and 
her former husband Mark was in Las Vegas, see R389:579. Given that Mark and the 
children had alibis, defendant's confession, and her numerous statements to investigators, 
family, and friends expressing hostility toward her in-laws, the jury reasonably rejected 
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defendant's assertion of innocence at trial, even absent any evidence of her tote bag and 
the fire starting items it contained. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPOINT NEW 
COUNSEL TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT AT SENTENCING 
In Point II of her brief, defendant asserts that merely because she alleged—in a 
post-trial, pre-sentencing letter to the trial court—that trial counsel was ineffective, see 
R326, and because she also examined trial counsel during a post-trial evidentiary hearing, 
see R391:28, "a conflict of interest exists between trial counsel and [] defendant, such 
that [her] motion for new counsel" at "sentencing" should have been granted. Aplt. Br. at 
6. In so arguing, defendant does not challenge the trial court's ruling rejecting her claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective at trial, nor does she assert that trial counsel was 
ineffective at sentencing—or that any true conflict existed between herself and counsel at 
sentencing. Defendant's claim therefore lacks merit and should be rejected. 
Proceedings below. Prior to sentencing, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing regarding defendant's claim that her trial counsel had been ineffective at trial. 
See R391. The Court heard from an attorney that represented defendant pretrial, one of 
defendant's trial witnesses, trial counsel, and defendant. Id. Thereafter, the trial court 
issued a Memorandum Decision rejecting defendant's claim. See R338-333 (a copy is 
contained in addendum B). The trial court found that it was "obvious" that trial counsel 
"did his best to show the jury that the State's case was based on faulty assumptions and 
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information from the very investigators who claimed to have heard the Defendant admit 
that she started the fire.55 R335. Notwithstanding the efforts of trial counsel, the "jury 
was not convinced . . . but that [did] not mean that the Defendant was ineffectively 
represented or that she suffered any prejudice. No such ineffectiveness has been 
demonstrated by the Defendant.55 R335. Given defendant's failure to demonstrate that 
her trial counsel was ineffective, the trial court found no reason to appoint new counsel to 
represent defendant at sentencing: "At that hearing, the Defendant will be given an 
opportunity to make whatever statement she chooses to make. She can also raise issues 
regarding the scoring on the Pre-sentence matrix. She is not bound to accept [trial 
counsel's] suggestions about what she should say to the court, and she may ignore those 
suggestions if she chooses to do so.55 Id at 334. 
Analysis. "The right to conflict-free representation is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.55 State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 21, 984 P.2d 382 (citing Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)). To show that this right has been violated a defendant 
must establish both that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest, and that the 
conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681, 686 (Utah 1997)). Further, "[t]o establish an actual conflict of interest,5' a defendant 
must show that trial counsel "had to make choices that would advance his own interests to 
the detriment of [the defendant's]." Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, defendant does not cite to Lovell or otherwise recognize her burden to 
demonstrate that an actual conflict existed between herself and trial counsel, and that the 
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alleged conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance. See Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Moreover, defendant does not challenge the trial court's ruling rejecting her claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective at trial, and she makes no assertion that trial counsel was 
ineffective at sentencing. Id. Rather, defendant broadly asserts that she was entitled to 
new appointed counsel at sentencing merely because she alleged, albeit unsuccessfully, 
that trial counsel was ineffective at trial. Id. Given Lovell, this broad claim is inadequate 
as a matter of law and should be rejected on that ground. 
Defendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Neither Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 
619 (Utah 1989), nor State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998), is reasonably read to 
suggest that a defendant can establish an actual conflict of interest with appointed counsel 
merely by alleging ineffectiveness. Indeed, Jensen dealt with the preservation of an 
ineffectiveness claim and held that Jensen could raise an ineffectiveness claim for the first 
time in a post-conviction petition because his failure to raise it on direct appeal had not been 
voluntary. 795 P.2d at 621. Vessey dealt with a trial court's responsibility to investigate an 
alleged conflict brought to its attention before trial, and held the inquiry must be meaningful. 
967 P.2d at 962. The Court also held that a trial court's failure to investigate an alleged 
pretrial conflict of interest is "per se error," but "eschew[ed] actual reversal until an actual 
conflict is established between the defendant and counsel of a magnitude requiring 
substitution of counsel." Id. at 962-63 (emphasis added). 
Based on the above, defendant's claim that any possible conflict she may have had 
with trial counsel here was "of a magnitude requiring substitution of counsel," is not only 
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unsupported in the record, it is unsupported by relevant case authority, and must therefore 
be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury conviction for aggravated arson, a first degree felony, should be 
affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[Ojral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R.App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ J a n u a r y 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER c -
/Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONNIE GULLI, 
Defendant. 
DEPUTY CLERK ^ ^ j Q , ^ • 
This matter came before the court on April 22, 2003, for an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The defendant was present and represented by her 
attorney, Dale W. Sessions. The State was represented by Scott F. Garrett, Iron County 
Attorney. The court heard evidence and argument, then took the matter under submission to 
allow the parties to submit supplemental memoranda of points and authorities by May 1, 2003. 
Having now considered the submissions of the parties, and the evidence presented, the court 
hereby renders the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision on the pending 
Motion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On or about August 13, 2003, there was a house fire in Cedar City, Utah. 
Investigation by authorities raised suspicions that the fire may have been the product of an act 
of arson. Law enforcement was called hi about 2:00 AM. About 4:30 AM Detective Kelvin 
Minefee of the Cedar City Police Department arrived on the scene. While there, Det. Minefee 
noted that one of the citizens present was dressed in a fleece outfit, in spite of the fact that the 
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morning was very warm. The detective made some inquiries and discovered that the young 
lady, Megan Gulli, had been at the scene of the fire shortly after it was discovered but had 
apparently gone home, changed her clothes, and then returned to the scene. Given the hour of 
the day, the detective found Megan's behavior curious. The house that was burned belonged 
to Megan's paternal grandparents. 
Detective Minefee began to suspect that Megan may have been involved in the setting 
of the fire and may have gone home to change her clothes to hide evidence that may have been 
on her original clothing. He approached Megan at the scene and spoke to her about the change 
of clothing. Megan was asked what she had done with her original outfit and she replied that 
they were being washed in her washing machine at home. Det. Mmefee then asked if he could 
smell Megan's hands. She agreed. When the detective sniffed Megan's hands, they smelled of 
fresh soap. The detective then asked Megan to meet him at her home so that he could talk to 
her and her mother, the defendant Conni Gulli. Both went to Megan's home in separate 
vehicles. 
At the Gulli home Detective Minefee was met by the defendant. He explained that the 
fire had apparently been intentionally set and explained his suspicions about Megan's conduct. 
He asked for, and was given, Megan's original outfit, some of which was still wet from the 
washing machine. Megan and the defendant both denied that Megan had any involvement in 
the fire. The detective then asked both mother and daughter to come to the Cedar City Police 
Department later in the day for a further interview and a Computerized Voice Stress Analysis 
test (CVSA), which is something of a lie detector test. Both mother and daughter agreed to do 
so. The detective left the Gulli home after about an hour, leaving the two women to go to bed. 
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The detective continued his investigation, making efforts to contact the owners of the 
burned home or their son. However, about 8:45 AM, he was called back to the scene of the 
fire by the local fire chief, Chief Irons, who showed him some additional evidence. The fire 
fighters had located a spot in the house where it appeared that gasoline had been poured to 
accelerate the start and spread of the fire. The fire was then officially deemed to be the result 
of arson. Investigators from the State Fire Marshall's office were called in. They traveled to 
Cedar City from Salt Lake and arrived about noon. 
After Detective Minefee spoke to Chief Irons, he used his cell phone to call the Gulli 
house to arrange an appointment for the defendant and her daughter to come to the police 
department for the further interview and the CVSA test to which both had agreed a few hours 
earlier. He reached the defendant, who became very agitated during the phone call. She 
began yelling at the detective, and informed him that neither she nor her daughter would be 
coming in for the interview and the CVSA test. Detective Minefee then told her that if she 
ended his ability to try to eliminate Megan as a suspect, he would pursue other means to 
determine whether Megan had been involved in the fire. The defendant then asked the 
detective what he intended to do and he responded that given the information he already had, 
he would arrest Megan based on probable cause because of her suspicious conduct. The 
defendant then told the detective that she would be hiring an attorney and demanded that the 
detective stay away from her daughter and herself. At some point, the detective ended the 
conversation by hanging up on the defendant. At no time up to this point did the detective 
have any suspicion that the defendant herself might be involved in the setting of the fire, nor 
did he suggest that she should admit such involvement. 
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When Investigators Hohbein and Dudzinski of the State Fire Marshall's Office arrived 
in Cedar City around noon, they went to the scene of the fire. There they were able to 
determine that the fire was in fact an arson fire. They then began an investigation of their 
own. As a first order of business they decided to contact the Gulli family to see if they could 
eliminate them as suspects in the fire. The two investigators went to the Gulli residence to 
speak to Megan and her brother Joseph. 
When the investigators arrived at die Gulli residence, they found Megan there with two 
male friends, Cason Lambeth and Cade Murdock. Investigator Dudzinski took the two young 
men to the back patio to speak with them while Investigator Hohbein interviewed Megan in the 
front room of the house. All three of the young people told the investigators that Megan had 
been with the two boys and some others at the Three Peaks area during the early morning 
hours of the day of the fire about the time the fire started. The investigators quickly realized 
that Megan could not have set the fire if that was true as Three Peaks is a mountainous area 
west of Cedar City by some distance. Megan also explained that she had changed clothes and 
washed her clothes because they were dirty from being out in the hills. 
At some point during the time that the investigators were speaking with Megan, Cade 
and Cason, a red Kia Sephia pulled into the driveway. The car was being driven by Joseph 
Gulli, Megan's brother. In the car with Joseph were his girlfriend, Emily Green, and his 
mother, the defendant. Joseph and Emily went into the house and began speaking with 
Investigator Hohbein and Megan. The defendant went to the back patio and approached 
Investigator Dudzinski, Cade and Cason. The defendant demanded the investigator's identity 
and then introduced herself. When Investigator Dudzinski realized who the defendant was, he 
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told her that he could not speak to her because she had invoked her right to an attorney in her 
phone conversation with Detective Minefee. The defendant immediately responded, Ti l talk 
to you. I just won't talk to Minefee." She then sat down and began telling Investigator 
Dudzinski a long story about her marital problems and a pendmg divorce of herself and the son 
of the owners of the burned house. Dudzinski listened to the story, which consumed most of 
an hour. The investigator asked no questions during the long recitation. 
During the defendant's story, Investigator Dudzinski began to sense that the defendant 
had a deep hatred for her parents-in-law, the fire victims, and that she blamed them, in part, 
for the failure of her marriage. Near the end of the story, the Investigator asked the defendant 
whether she had set the fire. The defendant answered that she did. During this lengthy 
conversation, the defendant spoke to the investigator in a calm, conversational tone and was 
very nice. There was no mention during that conversation of arresting Megan or Joseph. The 
defendant was not restrained during the conversation, which occurred on the defendant's own 
patio. 
During the time that Investigator Dudzinski was speaking with the defendant on the 
back patio, Investigator Hohbein was interviewing Joseph and Emily in the front room of the 
house. At some point, and after hearing the red car referred to as "Joseph's car" by those with 
whom he was speaking, Investigator Hohbein asked Joseph for permission to search "his 
vehicle". Joseph readily agreed and took Investigator Hohbein out to die red Kia Sephia 
parked in the driveway. Joseph produced keys for the vehicle from his pocket and opened the 
trunk and doors to the car. Joseph expressed no reluctance in agreeing to the search and 
placed no limitations on the search. 
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In the rear seat of the car, Investigator Hohbein found a green and cream colored 
canvas bag. He removed it from the car and began to search it when he was told by Joseph 
that the bag belonged to his mother, the defendant. Joseph did not tell the investigator that the 
bag should not be searched. Instead he stood watching as the bag was emptied. During the 
search of the bag, Investigator Hohbein found within it a broken Mason jar smelling strongly 
of gasoline, lint and paper soaked in gasoline and an empty book of paper matches. The items 
were wrapped in several plastic shopping bags. Realizing that he had found important 
evidence relating to the fire, Investigator Hohbein walked around to the back patio to inform 
Investigator Dudzinski of his find. He found Dudzinski just finishing his conversation with the 
defendant. Investigator Dudzinski told Investigator Hohbein that the defendant had just 
confessed to starting the fire. Hohbein then asked the defendant if she had done that. 
Defendant then said, "I'll take the rap. I'll take die heat on this one to protect my children." 
After these statements, Investigator Dudzinski told the defendant that he would be talking to 
the County Attorney about the matter and that he would tell the County Attorney that the 
defendant had been honest and had admitted starting the fire. No such comment was made to 
the defendant by anyone before she admitted her involvement. 
Following that conversation with the defendant, Investigator Hohbein put the items 
back in the bag as they had been at the beginning of the search and called the Cedar Police 
Department for assistance. Detective Minefee got the call and returned to the Gulli residence 
where he photographed the contents of the bag and took the bag into evidence. After the bag 
had been found and searched, Investigator Hohbein determined that Emily Green may have 
some ownership interest in the Red Kia and he asked both Joseph and Emily to sign a written 
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consent to search form, which they both did voluntarily. Further investigation determined that 
the red Kia Sephia actually is registered in the name of Emily's father in Farmington, Utah for 
insurance purposes. However, Emily considers herself the actual owner of the car and the 
principle driver. Joseph has free and unfettered use of the car, including possessing his own 
key, and drives the car to work daily and on errands around town. Joseph is not actually the 
owner of the car, however. Both Joseph and Emily remember giving their consent to a search 
of the car verbally before it was searched and written consent after the search had turned up 
the bag belonging to the defendant. 
The defendant was allowed to speak to her children Megan and Joseph alone in her 
bedroom following the admissions made on the back patio. While she was walking through the 
front room of the house, the defendant made another statement, overheard by Emily Green, 
that she would take the rap for this one to protect her children. After she spoke to her 
children, the defendant was handcuffed, arrested and taken to jail. 
Both Joseph and Emily identified the green and cream bag as belonging to the 
defendant. Both testified that they had seen the defendant carry the bag out or her house 
earlier in the day when they had given her a ride to the Care and Share. Defendant had asked 
Emily if she could leave the bag in the car when they arrived back at the house and saw that 
the fire investigators were there. 
ISSUES 
The defense seeks an order of this court preventing the use as evidence of the 
defendant's admissions to the State Fire Marshall's investigators and the contents of the bag 
from the rear seat of the car. 
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ANALYSIS 
Defendant's Admissions 
The defense argues that the admissions of the defendant were coerced by the officers 
through threats that they would arrest the defendant's daughter for starting the fire. The facts 
do not support that view. An examination of the totality of the circumstances indicates that the 
defendant was not under suspicion of any wrong doing and w as not under pressure from the 
police officers to admit any involvement in the fire. The conversation which ended by her 
admissions that she set the fire was initiated by the defendant even though she was told that the 
investigator could not talk to her because she had invoked her right to see an attorney. The 
defendant was not in a coercive setting, seated on her own patio with one investigator. The 
investigators asked no questions of the defendant during most of the long recitation in which 
she engaged until the investigator began to sense that the defendant did not like her parents-in-
law, the fire victims. At that point the defendant was asked simply whether she had started the 
fire, to which she answered in die affirmatively. 
Any comment that related to the arrest of the defendant's daughter came from an officer 
who was not present during the conversation in which the admissions occurred. The defendant 
had spent considerable time with her daughter after the officer stated that he planned to arrest 
her, and the defendant knew that no such arrest had occurred and further that the daughter had 
an alibi supported by several of her friends. Additionally, as a public policy matter, an officer 
should not be prevented from informing a parent that he plans to arrest that parent's child on 
probable cause because of the unforeseeable consequence that the parent might be motivated to 
make a false confession of guilt to prevent the arrest of the child. The law does not, and 
8 
01 
should not, recognize such a comment to a parent as improper coercion. It is illogical to think 
that a threat of arrest of a child because investigation has produced probable cause for that 
arrest would prompt a parent to falsely admit involvement in the crime to prevent the arrest. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, and considering the legal authorities cited by 
the parties, the court finds no evidence that the admissions of the defendant were the produce 
of improper coercion on the part of law enforcement authorities. Accordingly, the court finds 
no reason to suppress those admissions as evidence. 
Search Of The Defendant's Bag. 
The court is convinced by the evidence that the car was searched pursuant to valid 
consent from the persons in possession and control of the car. No authority has been cited by 
either side to indicate that the permission to search a car must come from the registered owner. 
In this case the car was being jointly used and possessed by the Joseph Gulli and his girlfriend, 
Emily Green. Both gave permission for the search before and after the incriminating evidence 
was found in the back seat. 
The defense argues that the police officer was prevented from search the bag from the 
back seat when he was informed that the bag belonged to the defendant, and not to Joseph or 
Emily. The law does not support that argument. At no time did Joseph place any limitation on 
the scope of his freely given consent to search the car. Even when the officer began to 
examine the contents of the bag, Joseph's only comment was that the bag belonged to his 
mother. He could easily have added that the bag should not be searched if he intended that 
limitation, but he said nothing of the sort. The law presumes that when consent to search a car 
is given, it applies to all containers within the car unless the person giving the consent limits 
the scope of the search. [See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)] 
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The defense argues further that the defendant does not lose her Fourth Amendment 
protections over her property just by leaving it in a car. However, her expectation of privacy 
is certainly diminished because when she leaves the bag in a car belonging to someone else, or 
being possessed and driven by someone else, she certainly must expect that the owner or driver 
of the car may give his permission for a search of the vehicle by police. One's expectation of 
privacy is protected only to the extent that is in harmony with law and sound public policy. 
Society should not recognize an expectation that persists even after personal property has been 
thrown away, or left in a public place, or left in the care of another who has access and control 
over that property. 
The court declines to suppress the contents of the bag as evidence in this case. 
SUMMARY 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 6th day of May 2003. 
J^ftlLIP EVES, I^trict Court Judge 
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Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONNI GULLI, 
Defendant. 
| FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
' IRON COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK r^rOs 
This matter came before the court for evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's request 
for new counsel. The Defendant was present representing herself in this hearing. The State 
was represented by Jeffery Slack, Deputy Iron County Attorney. The court heard evidence 
and argument and took the matter under submission to prepare this written opinion. 
ISSUES 
The Defendant asserts, first, that she was not properly represented during her jury trial 
by J. Bryan Jackson and, second, that there is now a significant difference of opinion between 
her and Mr. Jackson which would make it impossible for him to effectively represent her 
during the sentencing phase of these proceedings. 
ANALYSIS 
At the hearing the Defendant called as witnesses Mr. Dale Sessions, her previous 
counsel in this case; Mr. James Kropf, the special fire investigator who testified as a defense 
witness at the trial; Mr. Bryan Jackson, her current attorney in this case; and herself. The 
State presented no evidence but did ask some limited questions of the Defendant's witnesses. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE NO. 021500873 FS 
FILED 
DEC 3 1 2003 
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Mr. Sessions did not attend the trial and could not comment during his testimony on 
the competency of Mr. Jackson's representation of the Defendant during the trial. He did 
testify that since the trial, the Defendant had stated to him several concerns about Mr. 
Jackson's representation efforts at trial and in preparation for sentencing. He also testified that 
after he withdrew from the representation of the Defendant prior to the trial, he transferred 
completely all of his file to Mr. Jackson and met with Mr. Jackson to outline the defense 
theory in the case and the then current state of defense preparedness. 
Mr. Kropf testified that he did not agree with all of the tactical decisions made by Mr. 
Jackson during the trial, and stated that he would have objected to certain evidence to which 
Mr. Jackson did not object. Mr. Kropf is not an attorney, but is a fire investigator. On 
questioning by the court, Mr. Kropf stated that Mr. Jackson apparently chose to let some 
evidence come in and then attack it through later witnesses, rather than to try to block the 
evidence from coming before the jury. Mr. Kropf did testify that he spent more than 5 hours 
in preparation meetings with Mr. Jackson before the trial. Mr. Kropf also stated that he sat in 
on the entire trial, and made suggestions on tactics and questions to Mr. Jackson during the 
trial, some of which were accepted and some of which were not. 
Mr. Jackson testified that he has been unable to effectively communicate to the 
Defendant his strategy for the upcoming sentencing hearing. He has suggested that the 
Defendant make her statement on the case orally at the time of the hearing while the Defendant 
has asked him to submit a lengthy written statement to the Adult Probation and Parole agent 
preparing the Pre-sentence Report in this case. He has also asked the Defendant to express at 
sentencing her willingness to do what the court orders her to do now that she has been 
convicted by a jury decision. The Defendant apparently took that as meaning that he wanted 
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her to stand before the court at sentencing an admit that she started the fire. Defendant has 
expressed her continuing insistence that she did not start the fire and is offended by what she 
takes as Mr. Jackson's direction that she make that admission at sentencing. Mr. Jackson 
testified that he would be less that effective in representing the Defendant at sentencing 
because she has lost trust in his advice. 
Defendant testified that she had asked Mr. Jackson to question witnesses about a 
original police report and the times of events stated therein, particularly since some of those 
times differed from a later police report referred to by the prosecution and the witnesses. She 
testified that Mr. Jackson did not follow her suggestions. She had spent considerable time 
preparing the case with Mr. Sessions and would have like to have him represent her but 
understood that he had withdraw from that representation for ethical reasons. She has lost 
confidence in the advice of Mr. Jackson and feels that she would not be adequately represented 
at sentencing because Mr. Jackson has a different opinion of what she should say to the court 
than she does. She also fears that Mr. Jackson would not adequately dispute the scoring on 
the sentencing matrix done by the A.P. & P. agent. 
The court has considered that evidence and arguments of Defendant and now denies her 
motion for a new attorney. The evidence presented by the Defendant does not demonstrate 
that the representation provided by Mr. Jackson was ineffective. In order to prevail on that 
claim, the Defendant would have to demonstrate that Mr. Jackson's performance was sub-
standard and that it resulted in prejudice to her, preventing a fair trial. 
From the evidence presented, the court finds that Mr. Jackson may have taken a 
different strategic direction than Mr. Sessions was planning to take, but that difference in 
tactics did not result in sub-standard representation for the Defendant. In this case, the jury 
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had evidence before it that the Defendant had a strong motive to commit this crime, (that she 
blamed the victims, her in-laws, for breaking up her marriage to their son); that she was found 
with gasoline and other materials in her bag which could have been used to start the fire, (a 
broken mason jar with gasoline residue, plastic bags and dryer lint which could have been 
used a accelerants at the fire scene); that she was found in possession an empty matchbook 
which was scientifically matched up with one of the burned matches left at the crime scene, 
(the tear pattern from the burned match from the scene matched the stub of one of the matches 
in the matchbook found in the Defendant's bag the next day after the fire); and that she 
admitted starting the fire in the presence of two investigators from the State Fire Marshall's 
Office. 
All of the expert investigators, including the defense experts, testified that the fire was 
started by someone committing arson. The jury was called upon to decide whether the 
Defendant was that person. In view of the persuasive evidence pointing to the Defendant as 
the person who started the fire, the court finds that asking additional questions about 
differences in times stated in the police reports, or other details, would not have resulted in a 
different outcome at the trial. Therefore, the Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of 
Mr. Jackson's tactics at the trial. 
It was obvious to the court during the trial that Mr. Jackson did his best to show the 
jury that the State's case was based on faulty assumptions and information from the very 
investigators who claimed to have heard the Defendant admit that she started the fire. It was 
apparent that the defense tactic was to discredit those investigators and cast doubt on their 
claims that the Defendant admitted starting the fire. The jury was not convinced by that tactic, 
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but that does not mean that the Defendant was ineffectively represented or that she suffered 
any prejudice. No such ineffectiveness has been demonstrated by the Defendant. 
Additionally, the court sees no reason why the Defendant cannot be effectively 
represented by Mr. Jackson at sentencing and thereafter. At that hearing, the Defendant will 
be given an opportunity to make whatever statement she chooses to make. She can also raise 
issues regarding the scoring on the Pre-sentence matrix. She is not bound to accept Mr. 
Jackson's suggestions about what she should say to the court, and she may ignore those 
suggestions if she chooses to do so. 
The Defendant is entitled to be effectively represented by a competent attorney, not to 
have a new attorney at her whim. The court finds no reason to replace Mr. Jackson as he has 
effectively represented the Defendant to date and is able to do so in the future. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Defendant's request for new counsel is denied. The case should be scheduled for 
sentencing at the earliest opportunity. If the Defendant, or her counsel, or the State feel that 
the sentencing will take longer than 20 minutes, it should be given a special setting to 
accommodate the longer hearing. 
DATED this 29th day of December 2003. 
^t^C<l 
J./THILIP EVES, District Court Judge 
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